the early years of EMU to investigate the performance of these hypotheses.
While it is certainly far too early to make any conclusive judgements about the long-term effects of EMU on the member countries, much can be learned from the initial years of this remarkable monetary experiment. At one level, there have been surprisingly persistent differences in national inflation rates under EMU, such that the common monetary policy has not suited all member countries at all times and the impact of currency union on the behavior of national business cycles (plus the appropriate national policy response) has been a key feature of the EMU debate. At the same time, there is convincing evidence that EMU has also contributed to greater cross-border trade in finance and goods, delivering efficiency gains from market integration. However, an important theme is that EMU is not the only force shaping the euro area. In particular, international integration with the rest of the world has also been increasing rapidly, such that it is essential not to view the euro area as a closed unit but rather understand the member countries have myriad and differential linkages with each other and trading partners from outside the euro area.
The structure of the rest of this article is as follows. In section 2, we first briefly review differences in the macroeconomic performance of the individual member countries since the creation of EMU and ask whether a single currency has acted to amplify or moderate the sources of heterogeneity. We next turn in section 3 to asking whether monetary union has influenced the degree of economic union among the member countries. Section 4 addresses the political impact of EMU, while section 5 considers the role 1 While it may be technically correct to limit the acronym EMU to mean "economic and monetary union", I follow the widespread practice of employing it as an acronym for "European Monetary Union".
2 Of course, there was also a major debate about how the European Central Bank should develop its monetary framework and a significant challenge in terms of making operational the concept of the euro area as a currency union (e.g. defining and collecting the required macroeconomic data at the aggregate euro area level such that the ECB could treat the euro area as a unified economic area). 3 This article is not intended to be a comprehensive survey of the already voluminous literature on the real effects of EMU. The interested reader should consult the wide-ranging studies contained in HM Treasury (2003) and Baldwin et al (2003) and the papers commissioned for the 2005 EMU conference organized by the European Central Bank (http://www.ecb.int/events/conferences/html/emu.en.html).
A sufficient degree of monetary convergence was required to join EMU. Under the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, membership was conditional on an inflation rate no higher than 1.5 percentage points and a nominal long-term interest rate no more than 2 percentage points above the three best-performing member states.
In addition, in recognition of the dangers posed by fiscal instability for monetary policy, this was to be re-inforced with a budget deficit ceiling of 3 percent and public debt no greater than 60 percent of GDP.
While the fiscal criteria were not strictly achieved by all countries (highly-indebted Belgium and Italy were permitted to join), eleven countries had met the Maastricht Criteria by 1997. of EMU have seen a marked dispersion in national inflation rates across the euro area. The peak year for dispersion was 2000 in which inflation ranged from 1.5 percent in Germany to 5.6 percent in Ireland. As is shown in Table 1 , these two countries marked the extremes of the inflation distribution over 1999-2004, with Germany averaging an annual inflation rate of 1.4 percent and Ireland 3.8 percent. Table 1 also highlights that differences in inflation rates have been substantially larger in the services sector than in the goods sector, which places the focus on variation in the relative price of nontradables as the source of divergent inflation patterns.
As is shown in Table 2 , it is true that the dispersion of annual inflation rates under EMU has been reasonably similar to that for US regions. However, Table 2 also shows that there has been a substantial difference in the persistence of inflation differentials. Over the 1999-2004 period, the range of cumulative inflation across EMU member countries was 16.5 percent, whereas the range for US regions was only 8.7
percent.
The divergence in inflation rates reflects a number of factors. 5 Differences in core macroeconomic fundamentals justify some of the shifts in bilateral real exchange rates among member countries (in a monetary union, changes in bilateral real exchange rates can take place only through inflation differentials since nominal exchange rates are fixed by definition). There is heterogeneity across member countries in such deep fundamentals as initial levels of output per capita, demography and the pattern of industrial specialisation but also in regard to structural policies in relation to factor and product markets. These structural differences imply non-uniform trend productivity growth rates and also imply asymmetric 4 Greece was further behind in meeting the criteria and only joined EMU in 2001. 5 For more detailed analysis, see Lane (2003, 2004) , Angeloni and Ehrmann (2004) and Altissimo et al (2005) .
degrees of exposure to global shocks in particular industries (e.g. Asian import penetration in the textiles and electronics sectors; shifts in oil and other commodity prices).
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However, beyond these quasi-exogenous factors, it is also true that EMU itself has been a source of macroeconomic divergence. First, entry into EMU was a much bigger structural shock for peripheral member countries than for the core membership -in particular, long-term interest rates in the former group had been relatively high until the convergence in nominal rates under the EMU process kicked
in. While Table 3 shows that all member countries have enjoyed lower real interest rates under EMU, the decline relative to the pre-EMU period was much greater for the periphery. Of course, the improved long-term credit environment represents one of the primary benefits from EMU membership for these countries. However, it also generated rapid growth in lending and local housing booms in the favoured countries, with the sharp increase in demand contributing to inflationary pressures.
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Second, EMU acts as an amplification mechanism for asymmetric shocks. A common nominal interest rate implies that persistent differences in national inflation rates translate into differences in real interest rates across member countries: countries with relatively higher medium-term inflation enjoy lower real interest rates than those with below-average inflation, stimulating demand, credit growth and housing markets in the former group. 8 Over time, there is a offsetting corrective mechanism since the bilateral real appreciation experienced by the higher-inflation countries leads to a loss of competitiveness vis-a-vis the lower-inflation group, such that the initial boom is inevitably followed by a period of retrenchment.
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Third, the common external euro exchange rate was a source of asymmetric shocks for the member countries, in view of their differential trade and financial linkages with the rest of the world. While the rapid depreciation of the euro against the dollar and sterling during 1999-2001 was relatively unimportant for those member countries that primarily trade within the euro area, it represented an significant expansionary shock for other countries with a higher level of involvement in global trade. 10 In turn, 6 Even if such structural policies may be endogeous to the monetary regime (we return to this question in section 4), the inherited dispersion in the extent of reform at the inception of EMU is arguably an important source of variation in national productivity growth rates. 7 While some degree of permanent real exchange appreciation is justified for those countries that benefited the most from a improved monetary environment (at some level, it is akin to a positive long-term productivity shock), the concern is that there is also a significant temporary component generated by the credit-driven demand expansion. 8 While it is true that what matters for the real interest rate is the expected inflation rate, the persistence of national inflation rates documented in Tables 1 and 2 provide the link between actual and expected inflation rates. See Honohan and Leddin (2005) and Lopez de Salido et al (2005) for models of national business cycles under EMU. 9 Indeed, Germany's disappointing growth performance during the early years of EMU can be partly attributed to an initially-overvalued real exchange rate. The Netherlands provides an example of an intra-EMU boom-bust cycle, with a credit boom and high inflation in 1999-2001 followed by a contraction in economic activity that has reversed some of the real appreciation against partner countries. 10 Angeloni and Ehrmann (2004) make the interesting point that those member countries more open to external trade have a greater sensitivity to ECB policy actions, since an interest rate cut that depreciates the euro has a more powerful the subsequent euro appreciation during 2002-2004 reversed this effect -for instance, despite a booming domestic sector, Irish inflation fell markedly in the wake of the stronger euro (Honohan and Lane 2004) .
Figure 2 displays the cross-sectional medium-term Phillips Curve for the EMU member countries. In line with the procyclical impact of EMU in the propagation of shocks, it is not surprising that there is a clear positive relation between relative output growth and relative inflation (the correlation is 0.62).
However, Figure 2 also highlights that some slow-growing countries have also experienced significant inflation. Among the larger member countries, Italy and Germany provide a striking contrast -while not growing any faster than Germany over 1999-2004, Italy's consumer price level increased by a cumulative 6.8 percent more than the German level (the differential is even greater in terms of unit labour costs, which have increased by 17 percent relative to Germany). In similar vein, among the faster-growing countries, Spain and Finland grew at similar rates over this period but the former appreciated by 9 percent against the latter.
Another perspective on inflation divergence is provided in To the extent that some proportion of these shifts in real exchange rates (whether driven by external factors or domestic cost shocks) imply unsustainable levels of wage growth in some member countries, it poses an adjustment problem since the traditional solution to over-valuation (i.e. nominal depreciation of the national currency) is no longer available.
It is important to emphasize that the fact that EMU has some destabilizing features for the member countries does not mean that currency union has led to a net increase in macroeconomic instability.
It is widely agreed that the ECB has been successful in anchoring medium-term area-wide inflation expectations at around 2 percent -at least for some countries, the attainment of such stability outside the EMU framework may have been a more costly process. 11 In addition, even if asymmetric shocks have posed an adjustment problem, the ECB might have been done a better job in responding to the significant impact on these countries than on those that are insulated from the external value of the euro. 11 Especially for the smaller member countries, there is limited value in drawing inferences about the "no EMU" counterfactual from the experience of those European countries that have not joined EMU, since the external monetary environment for these countries is so heavily conditioned by the very existence of the euro area.
common shocks experienced by the member countries than would have resulted from non-coordinated monetary policies.
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Moreover, if EMU had not been formed, the traditional tensions between exchange rate stability and the attainment of domestic nominal targets may have generated destabilizing speculation in at least some of the member countries. In the absence of EMU, the faster-growing member countries might have been subject to speculative capital flows banking on currency appreciation; conversely, the slowergrowing member countries might have exposed to traditional currency-crisis dynamics, by which poor fundamentals increase the probability that these currencies will depreciate. These considerations are especially relevant for the smaller member countries in view of the importance of the exchange rate in determining the monetary environment for highly-open economies.
Finally, the impact of currency union on the macroeconomic cycles of the member countries is only one criterion by which EMU should be evaluated. In the next section, we investigate whether EMU is succeeding in promoting economic integration among the member countries. Indeed, if such integration generates efficiency gains that permanently raises output levels (or even the long-term growth rate), this should swamp the costs arising from any increase in cyclical volatility. Moreover, if a deeper level of economic integration is achieved over time, this should increase the suitability of a common monetary policy for all the member countries.
Is Monetary Union Fostering Economic Union?
Even if the common monetary policy has not suited all member countries at all times during the early years of EMU, the single currency project may have yielded benefits at the microeconomic level by promoting the integration of product and factor markets. In turn, if a deeper level of economic integration among the member countries is achieved over time, this should enable the monetary union to operate more smoothly. First, if the member countries share a common business cycle, then the sacrifice of independent national monetary policies is less expensive. 13 Second, to the extent that cyclical asymmetries do exist, a number of macroeconomic adjustment mechanisms may compensate for the absence of nominal exchange rate movements within the euro area.
In this section, we first probe whether EMU has promoted financial integration among the member countries. Next, we ask whether the single currency has increased product trade across the euro area.
12 Giannone and Reichlin (2005) document the properties of business cycles for the member countries, with global and
European factors accounting for a high proportion of output variance. In addition, a common monetary policy may be efficient in responding to the financial implications of global political shocks, such as 9/11. 13 Although economic integration may engender some forces that increase asymmetries across countries, the available empirical evidence suggest that the net impact is to increase the cyclical comovements across countries (Frankel and Rose 1998 We then turn to the impact of EMU on labor mobility and the structural reform of labor and product markets.
Financial Integration under EMU
The creation of more liquid and deeper financial markets possibly offer the most straightforward microeconomics gains from EMU. Beyond the direct gains in terms of microeconomic efficiency and growth, greater financial integration also facilitates a more cohesive currency union in a number of ways. First, the capacity to borrow and lend overseas enables individual member countries to smooth consumption in the face of temporary shocks to domestic income. Second, the ability to diversify financial risks reduces the exposure of domestic wealth to domestic shocks.
Financial Markets
Indeed, the single currency has had a visible impact in the re-organisation of European financial markets. 14 The most radical change is the swift integration of the euro-area bond market after the introduction of the single currency: yield differentials across member countries fell sharply, the volume of private bond issues grew rapidly and, save for the important exceptions of the clearing and settlement systems, the market microstructure converged to a common area-wide system. Moreover, the level of competition among financial intermediaries for underwriting and trading activities increased markedly, leading to a reduction in transactions costs, increased market access for higher-risk issuers and greater financial innovation (Pagano and von Thadden 2004) .
The impact of EMU on financial deepening is vividly illustrated in Figure 3 , which shows that the scale of the euro-denominated corporate bond market has grown rapidly: the outstanding stock of securities issued by corporates in the euro area has grown from 32.2 percent of GDP at the end of 1998 to 74. Moreover, spreads across government bond yields have narrowed to very low levels: for instance, the end-June 2005 spread on 10-year sovereign bonds was just 30 basis points. While this yield convergence in part reflects a convergence in fundamentals and the elimination of liquidity premia associated with the domestic-currency debts of the smaller member countries, it also reflects the fact that investors regard the bonds issued by member countries as very close substitutes. Table 5 shows for each member country the proportion of its portfolio of cross-border securities holdings that is allocated to its EMU partners. In regard to debt securities, there has been a sharp rise in the EMU-orientation of cross-border portfolios for most countries (Italy, Ireland and Finland provide the most striking cases). While less spectacular, Table 5 also shows that there has also been a widespread increase in the weighting of fellow EMU member countries in cross-border equity portfolios. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005a) and Lane (2005) find that there is a 'euro bias' in cross-border equity and bond holdings: controlling for other fundamentals, there is substantially more cross-border asset trade between members of the euro area than among other pairings (the central estimates of the euro effect is that it raises bilateral holdings between member countries by 62 percent for equities and 97 percent for bonds). Table 5 also displays the value of the cross-border portfolios of the member countries as a ratio to GDP.
In line with the acceleration of the financial globalization process around the world in recent years, the value of the international portfolios of EMU member countries have grown strongly since the late 1990s (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2005b) .
There is also some evidence that the introduction of the euro has enhanced foreign direct investment between member countries. Employing data over 1982 , De Sousa and Lochard (2005 estimate that the euro has raised intra-EMU FDI flows by 62 percent and FDI stock positions by 17 percent. This is consistent with the view that the euro has reduced trade costs, with trade-complementary FDI activity increasing in order to exploit improved trade opportunities within the euro area. Moreover, Barr et al. (2003) find suggestive evidence that EMU has also reduced the share of total inward FDI flows into Europe that is allocated to the EU countries that remained outside EMU, with the interpretation complementary interpretation is that ECB in effect subsidizes the bonds issued by less-creditworthy member governments by treating the debt of each member government as equivalent in the conduct of its open-market operations (Buiter and Sibert 2005) . However, the ECB has recently announced that it will only accept bonds with at least a single A-rating from one or more of the main rating agencies as collateral in its Repos and other collateralised lending operations. This means that a deterioration in national public finances could lead to a member country's sovereign debt excluded as acceptable collateral.
that the intra-European exchange rate stability offered by the euro area is proving to be attractive for export-platform multinational activity.
Finally, in terms of the banking sector, EMU has facilitated a rapid increase in inter-bank lending between EMU member countries and, supported by the rising securitisation of asset-backed loans, a narrowing in interest rate differentials on mortgage products. However, the evidence is that retail banking remains quite segmented across the euro area, with significant dispersion in retail interest rates and few cross-border transactions (Baele et al 2004) . Since the barriers to banking integration at the retail level are real in nature, it is not too surprising that the introduction of the single currency has done little to improve financial integration along this dimension. 
Macroeconomic Implications
From a macroeconomic perspective, it is important to assess whether the financial integration we have observed substantially improves cross-border consumption smoothing and risk diversification.
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Along one dimension, EMU has plausibly allowed some member countries to run larger external imbalances than was previously feasible. 18 As is shown in Table 6 , the relatively-poorer member countries such as Greece, Portugal and Spain have experienced substantially larger current account deficits under EMU. These countries have run current account deficits that have increased by an average 3.5 percent of GDP between 1995-1998 and 1999-2004 , with an average increase in the stock of net external liabilities of 36.4 percent of GDP between 1998 and 2004. Prior to EMU, investors would typically have required larger country risk premia to fund such deficits and the risk of a speculative attack on a debtor's currency would have increased -however, these countries are now largely insulated from such pressures.
In part, the increased ability of these countries to attract external capital reflects the extension of the home bias of euro area investors, such that claims on other euro area members are increasingly viewed as good substitutes for claims on domestic counterparties. Spiegel (2004) vividly illustrates this point in the case of Portugal -he finds that EMU has tripled lending to Portugal by banks in the rest of the euro area, with the EMU share of Portugeuse external borrowing increasing from 37.5 percent to 85.6 percent after the creation of the monetary union; this shift in the investor base highlights the importance of a 16 The European banking sector has seen much cross-border M&A activity in recent years but these transactions have largely not been between EMU member counrtries (e.g. major deals have taken place between Spain and the UK; across Scandinavia; and the entry by Austrian and other banks into the new EU member states). 17 Indeed, it is worth entering the caveat that the elimination of individual national currencies may actually have reduced the scope for diversification since currency union has meant that the relative returns on the nominal bonds issued by the member countries can no longer vary in line with shifts in bilateral nominal exchange rates. See Neumeyer (1998) on this point. 18 Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) document the widening of current account imbalances among EMU member countries and highlight the systematic pattern by which the poorer economies have responded to EMU by running larger current account deficits.
common currency in credit portfolios.
Of course, financial integration can deliver macroeconomic benefits even if the level of net borrowing/lending by member countries were low, since the gains to international diversification are related to the scale of gross cross-border asset trade. However, despite the recent growth in cross-border asset trade, the scale of cross-border risk sharing through financial markets remains limited. For instance, suppose that France experienced an idiosyncratic domestic downturn that also produced a 10 percent negative rate of return differential between French equities and equities in the rest of the euro area. Since France's equity liabilities to other EMU investors are about 10 percent of GDP, this 10 percent return differential maps into a net wealth gain Moreover, while the increase in cross-holdings among the member countries should increase risk sharing and thereby improve the functioning of the currency union (even if the quantitative magnitudes
are not yet very large), a potential source of divergent wealth dynamics relates to heterogeneity in the structure of the international portfolios held by the member countries. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004, 2005a) and Lane (2005) show that factors such as historical colonial ties, language and trade linkages influence international portfolio allocations and these characteristics significantly varry across member countries. Indeed, the tight financial linkages between the UK and the US has been cited as one factor behind the UK's reluctance to join EMU, since its capital income relies much more heavily on the US than is the case for the aggregate euro area (HM Treasury 2003).
It is also important to appreciate that the degree to which international financial integration can hedge against domestic macroeconomic risks is limited for the same reasons that domestic financial markets only offer partial protection against shocks to domestic labour income and other non-diversifiable components of wealth. Moreover, an important component of aggregate wealth -housing assets -are largely held by domestic households and differential trends in housing prices across member countries are an important source of divergent wealth dynamics that may have dominated any pro-convergence impact of capital market integration. 20 Figure 4 shows the growth in housing prices over 1997-2004 for the individual 19 If the 10 percent differential also applied to returns outside the euro area, the aggregate net wealth effect would be 2.9 percent and the consumption boost would be 0.15 percent of GDP. 20 Cross-border purchases of holiday homes and buy-to-let investment properties have mushroomed in recent years, so even the housing sector has been undergoing some degree of financial integration. (However, this is not particularly an EMU phenomenon but rather is taking place across Europe.) member countries. While Greece, Ireland and Spain each experienced cumulative price growth over 100 percent, housing values were stagnant in Austria and Germany at the other extreme. In light of this wealth divergence, it is not too surprising that consumption growth rates across the member countries have been heavily influenced by national factors.
Despite these divergent patterns in the early years of EMU, it is surely a mistake to extrapolate these patterns into the future. The shifts in relative housing prices and relative consumption are in part a onceoff adjustment to the new financial environment that has disproportionately benefited the peripheral and lower-income member countries. In addition, the process of cross-border financial integration remains quite incomplete, with the inherited exposures to domestic assets remaining important -over time, the extent of home bias (at least for marketed financial assets) should further decline. Subject to the qualifications discussed earlier, the contribution of financial integration to cross-border risk sharing may prove to be stronger in the future than it has been in the early years of EMU.
Evidence on Trade Integration
The pro-trade effect of a currency union was trumpeted in policy circles as one of the main benefits from a single currency. It was argued that the elimination of exchange rate uncertainty and associated frictions would boost trade among member countries. Beyond the direct welfare gains of facilitating more trade, it was hoped that greater trade integration would promote real convergence and also place arbitrage pressure on cross-border price differentials. In this subsection, we ask whether EMU has indeed led to greater trade integration among the euro area members.
Growth in the Volume of Trade
We first review the evidence in relation to the effect of EMU on the volume of trade among member countries. By examining a very large sample of industrial and developing countries, Rose (2000) famously found that a currency union boosted bilateral trade by more than 300 percent; subsequent refinements still leave the estimated effect above 50 percent (Rose 2004) . However, the relevance of these estimates to the EMU case has been much debated, since the currency unions in the Rose sample mostly involved very small, poor and remote countries. Micco et al (2003) provided the first comprehensive study of the effects of EMU on trade. Using homogeneous samples (just members of the European Union and, in an expanded specification, a sample of 22 advanced economies), these authors find that, controlling for a host of other variables, EMU has increased trade among member countries by 8-16 percent. While this is small relative to the original Rose estimates, it is economically significant for a group of countries that already had strong bilateral trade linkages and a high degree of institutional integration through membership of the European Union.
Moreover, Rose's work had also established that the long-run impact of currency unions substantially exceeded the short-term gains, such that this figure plausibly sets a lower bound for the long-term cumulative impact of EMU on intra-area trade volumes. Baldwin (2005) provides a wide-ranging review of the subsequent empirical work and concludes that a boost in trade of 5-15 percent is a robust estimate.
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An intriguing feature of the Micco et al study is that these authors found no evidence of trade diversion -trade between EMU member countries and other industrial nations was also boosted by the introduction of the euro. This result suggests that the currency union has acted to reduce trade costs between the euro area and the rest of the world and accords with recent developments in the theory and empirics of international trade that emphasize fixed costs in entering external markets, such that a discrete reduction in trading costs can induce a substantial trade response by increasing the proportion of firms that export, in addition to increasing the export volumes of firms that already trade -that is, the extensive margin of trade expands in addition to the intensive margin (Melitz 2003 , Baldwin 2005 . This is reinforced by the evidence concerning the sectoral composition of the increase in trade: Baldwin et al (2005) find that EMU had the largest impact on trade for those industries characterized by increasing returns and imperfect competition, with trade in homogeneous products relatively less affected.
Tables 7-9 provide a wider perspective on the evolution of trade for the EMU member countries. Table 7 shows that international trade has increased in importance for most member countries since the mid-1990s. However, Table 8 shows that the relative share of intra-EMU trade has not markedly changed over this period (and has even declined for some countries). While the introduction of the euro may have boosted trade among the member countries, it also promoted trade with non-members and other factors have also served to increase the scale of external trade (e.g. falling communications costs, an expansion in export-platform FDI, export-orientated growth strategies in China and elsewhere).
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Since EMU has not much increased the relative importance of intra-union trade, this weakens the argument that the trade channel endogenously increases the cohesiveness of the euro area as an optimum currency area. Indeed, as is shown in Table 9 , a noteworthy feature is that there is substantial heterogeneity across the member countries in terms of their extra-EMU trade patterns. To the extent that the importance of these external trade linkages has increased in recent years, the scope for asymmetric external shocks across the euro area has also increased. 21 Gomes et al (2004) and Berger and Nitsch (2005) make the point that the trend increase in trade volumes among EMU member countries has been stronger than for other EU countries for many years, reflecting a greater commitment to integration among those countries that also signed up to the single currency. However, even if this is the case, this does not rule out the introduction of the euro having a positive impact on trade volumes, with these countries forming the monetary union precisely as a mechanism to ensure further trade integration. 22 Tables 7-9 refer to merchandise trade. However, the more limited OECD data on the geography of services trade paint a similar picture -the share of intra-EMU trade in services did not markedly increase during 1999-2002.
Convergence in Prices
It was hoped that a single currency would promote convergence in prices across the euro area by improving trade linkages and increasing the tranparency of price differentials that could be arbitraged away: the prediction was that we should expect to see less price dispersion, at least for tradable goods, across the members of the euro area.
For the period 1990-2003, Engel and Rogers (2004) study comparative price data for 139 products across 18 cities in the euro area (plus 7 cities from outside the euro area) from the proprietory Economist
Intelligence Unit survey . In fact, these authors find that price dispersion has not decreased post-EMU;
rather, it seems that there was a substantial reduction in price differentials in the early 1990s, associated with the 1992 EU Single Market initiative, but with no further narrowing associated with EMU.
Allington et al (2005) employ national-level Eurostat price indices for 115 tradable product categories
for the set of EU countries. While the dispersion of national consumer price levels changed little for the EMU member countries post-1999, these authors show that dispersion in many product categories significantly declined in comparison to the degree of dispersion among the non-EMU member countries.
Moreover, in line with intuition, the decline in relative dispersion was strongest for the most-tradable product categories (e.g. electrical goods). Another finding from this study is that the decline in dispersion among the EMU member countries has been larger for the peripheral countries than for those countries that historically maintained stable exchange rates against the deutschemark. This suggests that the elimination of exchange rate risk has indeed been an active mechanism by which EMU promotes crossborder arbitrage.
Although it may be the case that the forces limiting price dispersion have been stronger among EMU member countries than among other EU countries, the degree of price convergence within the euro area has been disappointing ( Figure 5 ). For these reasons, it is not at all clear whether EMU per se had much to do with price convergence in this sector.
that relates to distribution and retailing costs, consumer prices may diverge even while price dispersion narrows for the underlying "purely tradeable" components. However, Baldwin (2005) provides another way to reconcile the increase in the volume of trade with the lack of price convergence -in line with the extensive margin hypothesis, if trade growth is mostly driven by an increase in the number of varieties being sold across borders, there is less pressure on price gaps for specific goods.
Cross-Border Labor Mobility
It is well known that both intra-national and cross-border labor mobility is much lower in Europe than in the US: language differences and other cultural barriers, together with non-coordinated pension and entitlement systems, are major barriers to an integrated labour market. While it is unlikely that migration decisions are much affected by the creation of a currency union, the resilience of the currency union in coping with asymmetric shocks would be improved by an increase in labor mobility. Table 11 shows that net migration flows have been increasing in recent years (albeit from a low base).
Moreover, there is a clear correlation between net migration rates and output growth rates, with fastgrowing countries such as Ireland and Spain experiencing unprecedented immigration. In addition, the 
Structural Reform in Labour and Product Markets
The loss of an independent exchange rate policy is less costly, the more flexible are labour markets. In the same vein, the more liberalised are product markets, the more efficiently will industries adjust to shocks. For these reasons, it was hoped that EMU would accelerate the pace of structural reform in the member countries by raising the costs of excessive rigidity.
With respect to the labor market, theory is ambiguous on whether a currency union promotes wage flexibility. Since national wage growth has little impact on ECB interest rates (especially for the smaller member countries), a traditional source of wage restraint has been removed (the threat that wage push shocks would be offset by higher interest rates). However, this has to be counter-balanced against the increased harm from excessive labor costs under EMU, which can no longer be eliminated through currency depreciation. Calmfors (2001) highlights that the greater nominal wage flexibility that may be desirable under EMU is best promoted by social pacts that enable a high degree of national coordination in wage setting, in view of the fact that the microfoundations for nominal wage stickiness plausibly are rooted in coordination failures in highly-decentralised wage setting environments. However, Calmfors is pessimistic that the social pact model is a stable institutional arrangement over the longer term: the forces driving decentralised wage setting (globalisation, declining union membership, the flattening of corporate structures) are likely to prove dominant. Indeed, the greater wage flexibility that has been observed in some industries in recent years seems to be largely a response to increased capital mobility and the outsourcing threat rather than having much to do with EMU.
The more challenging external environment has also led to increased demands for protectionism in both labor and product markets. While the Schroder government initiated a series of mild reforms, the recent German election sent a clear signal that the electorate was resistant to more radical proposals for market liberalisation; the momentum for reform has also largely stalled in France and Italy. Similarly, the proposed EU Services Directive that aims to promote competition by creating a single EU-wide market in services has met with strong resistance from key member states. More broadly, Duval and Elmeskov (2005) review the available statistical evidence and find that the momentum of the reform process has slowed down in the euro area. Importantly, find that EMU has had little impact on pricing dynamics, indicating that there has not been any radical change in the extent of price rigidities.
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While the slow pace of structural reform has much to do with deeply-entrenched political obstacles, EMU may be partly responsible for the slow pact of structural reform. 26 With an independent currency, a country that undertakes structural reform will enjoy lower interest rates, since the monetary authority will accomodate an increase in the potential output level of the economy; under EMU, the ECB targets areawide conditions and so only partially responds to reforms in individual member countries. In view of the myriad political obstacles to greater coordination of structural reform efforts (the ECB would respond to an improvement in area-wide conditions), this means that the short-term incentive to undertake reforms has diminished.
4 The Role of National Fiscal Policy inside a Monetary Union
The conduct of national fiscal policies has always been viewed as centrally important in determining the success of EMU. At one level, a major focus has been on the need for sound fiscal positions as an underpinning for the ECB to achieve its primary objective of price stability. At another, a common monetary policy means that national fiscal policies are the major tool by which governments can achieve 25 The rigidity of prices and wages in the euro area is a contributory factor to the greater persistence of inflation differentials relative to the US that was highlighted in section 2. 26 See Saint-Paul (2004) and Duval and Elmeskov (2005) for elaborations of this argument. 27 The European Union's Lisbon Strategy (agreed in 2000) has sought to accelerate structural reform through greater policy coordination but has achieved little. See Alesina and Perotti (2004) for an account of the limits to policy coordination in the European Union.
macroeconomic stability in the event of asymmetric shocks.
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As is shown in Table 12 , national fiscal positions significantly improved during the 1990s, with the Maastricht criteria motivating fiscal adjustment among the countries seeking to join EMU. 29 In order to ensure that this momentum towards fiscal discipline would continue under EMU, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was introduced in 1998 in order to ensure that national fiscal policies would target medium-term fiscal balance and avoid excessive deficits, as defined by a deficit limit of 3 percent of GDP. 30 The SGP operates through multilateral surveillance that is intended to prevent departures from sound fiscal policy and a penalty mechanism that obliges a member country to undertake corrective policies if it is deemed to be running an "excessive deficit," with the threat of financial sanctions for non-compliance. While there has been much coverage of the failure of the SGP to rein in growing deficits in France and Germany, the available evidence does suggest that is has been helpful in providing an external anchor for fiscal discipline in the smaller member countries (Annett 2005) . However, in terms of political acceptability, it is also clear that the SGP is an inadequate substitute for domestic institutional arrangements that can deliver medium-term fiscal sustainability without the involvement of external authorities (Wyplosz 2005) .
In terms of the contribution of fiscal policy to macroeconomic stabilization, the evidence suggests that fiscal policy in the member states became more countercyclical during the 1990s (Gali and Perotti
2003)
. 31 To a large extent, this is the natural counterpart to the improvement in medium-term fiscal discipline -a lower debt level and a commitment to medium-term stability makes it easier to temporarily increase deficits during downturns. Indeed, there was a countercyclical loosening of fiscal policy across the euro area in response to the 2001 economic slowdown. However, this fiscal expansion caused problems for the SGP, since the good times during 1999-2000 were not used to accumulate surpluses -except for 28 There are two other dimensions of fiscal policy that are relevant to EMU. First, the lack of coordination of national fiscal policies means that the aggregate fiscal response to a macroeconomic shock may be suboptimal. Second, the euro area lacks a federal fiscal system such that cross-border fiscal insurance does not play a role in adjusting to asymmetric shocks. Both of these features sharply differentiate the euro area from the United States. However, the current extent of political integration in the euro area means that neither greater fiscal coordination nor a US-style federal fiscal system is on the policy horizon. 29 The 1990s saw a general improvement in fiscal positions in most advanced economies, such that the importance of the Maastricht treaty in driving fiscal reform is open to debate -in the absence of the treaty, European countries may have achieved fiscal adjustment through other mechanisms. 30 The SGP did make allowances for a larger deficit in the case of a severe economic downturn (a fall in real GDP of at least 2 percent, with a decline greater than 0.75 percent possibly qualifying depending on supporting evidence). However, downturns of this severity are exceptionally rare. 31 From another angle, destabilizing national fiscal policies have historically been a major source of cyclical divergence across countries (Darvas et al 2005) . For this reason, the coherence of a monetary union at the least requires that fiscal policy is itself not a source of asymmetric shocks. Ideally, of course, it is desirable that fiscal policy goes further and actually dampens inefficient fluctuations in output.
Finland, all member countries ran procyclical expansionary fiscal policies during this period of relatively strong economic growth (Annett 2005) . 32 As a consequence of not achieving fiscal surplus or balance during the upswing, the post-2001 countercyclical fiscal expansion caused some countries (most notably
France and Germany) to breach the 3 percent deficit limit. 33 Uncertainty about the willingness of countries to accumulate sufficiently large surpluses during boom periods means that the jury is still out on whether national fiscal policy will prove to be an effective stabilization tool under EMU.
There are currently myriad proposals to improve the operation of fiscal policy over the cycle, which typically involve designing a domestic policymaking process that minimizes the political bias towards fiscal procyclicality (Calmfors 2005 , Wyplosz 2005 ). In addition, the depoliticization of fiscal stabilization politicians, the danger is that such discretion would be abused for electoral purposes.)
The Political Viability of EMU
There is little doubt that a primary motivation for EMU was to foster further political integration in Europe (Wyplosz 1997) . Beyond the symbolic value of sharing a common currency, it was believed that the economic integration spurred by currency union would sufficiently raise the degree of interdependence to spur a deepening of political cooperation. Moreover, it was perceived that the beggar-thy-neighbor impact of periodic adjustment through nominal devaluations had contributed to political disharmony (Eichengreen 1996) . However, it is also possible to make the case that, by engendering increased macroeconomic instability at the national level, premature or inappropriate monetary integration may reduce political solidarity among the member countries (Feldstein 1997) . To some extent, the demand by some Italian politicians in 2005 that Italy should exit EMU and re-introduce an independent currency as a way to respond to its loss of competitiveness is a vindication of this viewpoint. However, the costs of leaving EMU are so high in terms of the risk premium that would attach to the new currency of any renegade that entry into 32 An additional factor during this period was the decline in interest rates upon entry to EMU was a fiscal windfall for several member countries by sharply reducing debt servicing costs. Although in part this enabled reductions in debt levels and taxation, it primarily translated into growth in non-interest expenditures. 33 The original SGP was suspended in November 2003 when the ECOFIN council of the EU's finance and economics ministers declined to accept the European Commission's recommendation that France and Germany be subjected to enhanced surveillance under the SGP's "excessive deficit procedure." A revised version of the SGP was agreed in 2005 that allows for considerably more flexibility in determining the conditions under which a budget deficit is excessive.
EMU must be interpreted as a virtually irreversible act.
Moreover, the available Eurobarometer survey evidence suggests that EMU enjoys a reasonable level of popular support. As is shown in Table 13 , a majority of the euro-area population (albeit a slender one) believes the introduction of the euro has been beneficial. Moreover, EMU has made 19 percent "feel more European," which is the reaction desired by the political fathers of EMU that viewed it as a vehicle to promote political integration. Remarkably, these positive results coexist with the widespread popular belief that EMU has been responsible for an increase in prices and failed to reduce price dispersion across the member countries (columns (3)-(4) in Table 13 ).
However, the recent rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty in referendums in France and the Netherlands has demonstrated the current lack of popular support for deeper political integration at the EU level. While the anti-integration mood has little to do with EMU, the lack of impetus towards greater political integration may yet prove to be a serious challenge to the political durability of EMU.
For instance, consider the scenario in which a severe slump or a banking collapse in a member country engenders a national debt crisis, with an increase in risk premia and potential spillover effects on areawide financial markets. The capacity of the euro area to respond to such a financial crisis is at yet untested. If it is unthinkable to permit the breakup of EMU, a crisis episode may prove to be the catalyst for greater political integration. For instance, an emergency fiscal transfer to a member country in crisis may subsequently lead to a consensus that more effective restrictions on national fiscal policies are required in order to minimize the risk of any future crisis and/or to formalize the conditions under which such emergency transfers may be paid in the future.
34
6 Final Remarks EMU is a remarkable monetary experiment and its initial years have thrown up an array of fascinating evidence. On the debit side, we have shown how EMU has acted to amplify cyclical divergences across the member countries: however, this is partly attributable to the once-off adjustment to the new monetary environment and these forces may prove to be weaker in the future. That said, the entry of the new EU member states into EMU in the coming years means that macroeconomic divergence within the euro area is likely to remain a major challenge for national policymakers. On the credit side, there is convincing evidence that currency union has spurred trade and financial integration among the member countries, 34 An emergency fiscal transfer could also take the form of a subsidized loan from the ECB, which would in effect be financed by reduced seigniorage revenues for the other member countries. If the national financial crisis threatened the stability of area-wide financial markets, the ECB would also be compelled to relax its monetary stance. In the event of a banking crisis, pressure would also grow for the transfer of financial supervision responsibilities to a European-wide regulatory authority.
generating direct welfare gains which may well prove to be the dominant factor in assessing the long-term net impact of EMU.
However, the euro area is still some distance from the definition of an optimum currency area: marketbased risk sharing arrangements are likely not an adequate substitute for a US-style federal fiscal transfer system; although increasing, labor mobility remains low; structural rigidities still permeate product and labor markets; and the likelihood that national fiscal policies will contribute much to stabilization remains unproven. Moreover, there is little sign that political integration among the member countries will increase any time soon. For these reasons, despite the highly successful launch of EMU, it remains an open question whether national economies will prove to be sufficiently flexible to enable smooth adjustment in the event of a major asymmetric shock or a financial crisis. -1991 Q4-1991 Q3-1992 Q2-1993 Q1-1994 Q4-1994 Q3-1995 Q2-1996 Q1-1997 Q4-1997 Q3-1998 Q2-1999 Q1-2000 Q4-2000 Q3-2001 Q2-2002 Q1-2003 Q4-2003 Q3- A u s t r i a B e l g i u m F r a n c e G e r m a n y I t a l y L u x e m b o u r g N e t h e r l a n d s F i n l a n d G r e e c e I r e l a n d P o r t u g a l S p a i n Housing Price Growth, 1997-2004 Note: Budget surplus is the ratio of general government fiscal balance to GDP; Structural balance is the cyclically-adjusted fiscal surplus as a ratio to GDP; Debt-GDP ratio refers to the gross debt of the general government. Source: OECD Economic Outlook database.
